Pages that link to "Item:Q166384"

The following pages link to Mechanism Design in Auctions and Procurement Contracts (Q166384):

Displayed 30 items.

• Steven T. Anderson (Q44476) ‎ (← links)
• Emil D. Attanasi, Ph.D. (Q44561) ‎ (← links)
• Benjamin Brooks (Q45017) ‎ (← links)
• Paul Ferraro (Q138869) ‎ (← links)
• Andrew Miller (Q141215) ‎ (← links)
• Douglas Lipton (Q141746) ‎ (← links)
• Sandra Haire (Q142118) ‎ (← links)
• Christophe Le Page (Q143207) ‎ (← links)
• Benjamin Hobbs (Q143426) ‎ (← links)
• Carl D Shapiro, Ph.D. (Q163069) ‎ (← links)
• Some interpretations of sequential bid pricing strategies (Q232428) ‎ (← links)
• Expectations, market structure, and sequential bid pricing (Q232801) ‎ (← links)
• Norms for bid distributions in sealed tender markets: An approach through simmulation (Q233383) ‎ (← links)
• Sequential decision making in computational sustainability via adaptive submodularity (Q233993) ‎ (← links)
• Mingshi Chen (Q243613) ‎ (← links)
• Preemption games: theory and experiment (Q247866) ‎ (← links)
• Bar-Ilan University (Q331222) ‎ (← links)
• Google (United States) (Q331813) ‎ (← links)
• Chapman University (Q332317) ‎ (← links)
• Microsoft (United States) (Q332466) ‎ (← links)
• Northwestern University (Laoag, Philippines) (Q332468) ‎ (← links)
• Harvard University Press (Q332552) ‎ (← links)
• Quest University Canada (Q332578) ‎ (← links)
• RoZetta Institute (Q333104) ‎ (← links)
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Q333589) ‎ (← links)
• eBay (Ireland) (Q334757) ‎ (← links)
• eBay (United States) (Q334758) ‎ (← links)
• Istanbul Bilgi University (Q335390) ‎ (← links)
• Charles River Associates (Q335660) ‎ (← links)
• Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Q335852) ‎ (← links)